Maersk Alabama email exchange with Larry Johnson
My post on Larry Johnson’s intel about the rescue of Captain Philips only quoted
a few representative bits of Johnson’s information. For those who are interested in
Johnson’s full take, he gave me permission to post our full exchange.
In sequence:
1. Email from LJ to Curt at Flopping Aces, 4-29-09, RE: “BUSTED: The Obama
Pentagon flat-out lied about the SEAL team timeline (ACTUAL DELAY, 52 HOURS),”
by Alec Rawls, 4-29-09.
From: Larry Johnson
Date: Apr 29, 2009 1:30 PM
Subject: I Can Give you More Background
To: Curt
Saw this piece (below) at your site. It is not correct and is
misleading. I have worked with the US military spec ops forces since
1994 and I am specifically involved in the training regimen for these
kinds of deployments. The Spec Ops folks received the first notice of
the pirate attack around 8am edt on 8 April. They went forward with a
recommendation to SOCOM. SOCOM in turned made a recommendation to
SecDef and it hung there in limbo until Friday at around 11 am edt.
Because this was a US flagged vessel it was initially handled as a MOTR
(Maritime Operational Threat Response) rather than the JCS CONPLAN
0300/0400 (http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf). This
led initially to a bit of a tug of war between Homeland Security and
DOD over who was in charge. While that turf battle was underway the
FBI CIRG was tasked to get engaged with trying to negotiate with the
pirates (USG makes a distinction between "negotiations" vice
"concessions." We will negotiate but will not make concessions. This
has been the policy since Reagan.) In addition, FBI sent a team to
Kenya to meet the Maersk and its crew, conduct interviews, collect
evidence and be prepared for a possible prosecution if any of the
pirates were taken alive.
Morning of the 10th SecDef finally issued Alert/Deployment order and
the SEALs went into action. That order went out around 11 am, not 8 pm
as your writer contends. A SEAL element already in the region deployed
and arrived the Bainbridge around 4 pm edt. A larger SEAL element
deployed from another base outside of the region and parachuted in
early Saturday.
It was not up to the Captain at the scene to request the SEALs. As you
know I am no fawning pal of Obama and have been quite tough on him, but
in this case he was not given the option of deploying the SEALs until
Friday morning and, when he was given that option, he pulled the
trigger.
SOURCE REDACTED
If you'd like some more background I'd be happy to chat with you via
phone.
LJ
2. My response to LJ, 4-29-09.
-----Original Message-----
From: Alec Rawls
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 6:58 PM
To: Larry Johnson
Cc: 'Curt'
Subject: RE: I Can Give you More Background
Larry:
Thanks for the info. I am the author of the report you commented on. Will keep confidential what
you request.
If you can, I would like to know more about your statement that: "It was not up to the Captain at
the scene to request the SEALs." Does this mean that he DID NOT request the SEALs? Or are
you saying that it was not up to him to present this request to the president?
The Pentagon source who talked to Joe Miller at Annenberg FactCheck [cited in my post]
describes the SEAL team request making its way up and back down the chain of command,
starting with Captain Castellano. (This is same source who told Miller the 8:00PM time for the
authorization):
"Although Phillips was taken hostage on April 8, the Pentagon didn't actually take charge of the
situation until the U.S.S. Bainbridge arrived on the scene on April 10. At that point, Pentagon
officials told us, the captain of the Bainbridge requested the resources to resolve the situation.
By 8:00 p.m. (Washington time) on April 10, President Obama had authorized the redeployment
of a SEAL team from Kenya to the Bainbridge. Pentagon officials told us that the request worked
its way up and back down the chain of command in a few hours, not a day-and-a-half, as the e-
mail states."
If Miller is reporting accurately, then he was told the wrong arrival time for the Bainbridge (by a full
day) and the wrong time for the authorization (maybe he was supposed to say local time instead
of Washington time).
Are you saying that this source is also wrong about the whole idea of the Spec Ops request
originating with Captain Castellano, then going up and down the chain of command?
It seems eminently plausible to me that Castellano would have requested resources, or at least
made sure that someone else had requested them, and that the hang up was in deciding to pass
this request on to Obama. The speculation I put forward in my first post was that Castellano
would actually have requested the resources he was likely to need as soon as he was underway,
rather than waiting until he arrived at the Bainbridge. This seems like it COULD be what you are
saying as well, with the timeline you describe for Spec Ops involvement:
"The Spec Ops folks received the first notice of the pirate attack around 8am edt on 8 April. They
went forward with a recommendation to SOCOM. SOCOM in turned made a recommendation to
SecDef and it hung there in limbo until Friday at around 11 am edt."
The difference is, you seem to be saying that the recommendation to deploy Spec Ops came
from Spec Ops, after they were apprised of the situation. Can you be more specific? Is it that
Castellano or someone in the Middle East called for more resources, then left it for the Spec Ops
folks make a recommendation of just what resources to send?
If the recommendation originated within Spec Ops, without any actual request from anyone else,
that doesn't seem to be much different. Is there a significant difference between a
recommendation and a request? It seems that, at least in this case, either would start at a mid-
level of the chain of command, then work its way up and back down.
Whatever the exact specifics, it seems that the call for a Spec Ops deployment came very early
on. 8am edt April 8th is 4:00PM local time, which was about an hour into the Bainbridge's 13 hour
trip to the Maersk Alabama.
In this case, the only affect on the substance of my post would be to add another 12 hours to the
delay in authorizing deployment (offsetting the 9 hour shortening of the delay on the other end, if
it came at 11:00 AM Friday instead of 8:00 PM).
The other possibility is if one wants to say that a recommendation is not a request, so that in a
technical sense, the only delay in authorizing a request was the time it took the President to
authorize deployment after CENTCOM made its formal request for authorization. But I have been
addressing and rejecting that distinction from the beginning.
Obama obviously has enough people of his own CENTCOM by now to implement his policy
choices for him. If he wants to delay authorization, he just has his CENTCOM people delay in
ASKING for authorization, that that is still an Obama delay.
Your own remarks seem to point in this direction: that a key to the delay in asking for
authorization was the treatment of the hijacking as civilian crime, which is one of the Obama
administration's well-known policy preferences. The Global War on Terror is now officially
defunct. The plan going forward is to treat our Islmaofascist enemies as criminals wherever
possible.
You note that just as a matter of established procedure, incident was initially handled as a MOTR,
but that would be immediately reviewed. As soon as the incident was the object of CENTCOM's
attention, the question would be whether it SHOULD be treated as a MOTR, and what that would
mean strategically. Those are policy questions. Thus if the MOTR designation continued to cause
a delay, that would seem to be a direct consequence of the Obama administration's policy
preferences.
I am Very interested in hearing in your further thoughts, if you want to pass them along.
Alec Rawls
3. LJ’s response, 4-29-09.
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Johnson
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 10:31 PM
To: Alec Rawls
Subject: Re: I Can Give you More Background
Alec,
I'll try to make this as clear as possible without getting into the
classified side of things. Any request from the Captain of the
Bainbridge would go thru his chain of command ultimately to the JCS.
The Joint Chiefs and SecDef did not request/recommend deploying the
SEALs until Friday morning. As I noted to Curt the initial decision
was to handle this as a MOTR incident rather than a terrorism
incident. Obama did not get the recommendation/request to deploy the
SEALs until Friday.
SOCOM (Special Operations Command) volunteered on the 8th to send its
forces forward. That recommendation went forward to JCS, who
postponed the decision. There were several SVTCs (Secure Video Tele
Conferences) and some off-line meetings between noon on Wednesday and
Friday morning. It really took that long to get a clearer picture of
what the situation was on the "ground."
A buddy of mine who participated in the meetings (he is a retired
military officer) at the White House told me on Wednesday that the
Bainbridge was 20 hours away. I understand that the ship did not get
to the Maersk until closer to midnight edt on the 8th, which was
actually close to 8am Thursday morning off the coast of Somalia.
The reality is that Castellano is not cleared into the compartmented
program that deals with the deployment of Special Ops Forces. Most of
the conventional force commanders are not read in.
The SEALs were given the deployment order on Friday morning Washington
DC time around 11am. That means the SEALs in Africa (they did not
deploy from Kenya but another location) started moving around 8pm
their time. There was no vacillating on anyones part. Once SecDef
issued the order (which was coordinated with the NSC) they started
moving.
The confusion on time is always a brain number. That's why the
military talks in ZULU time. The deployment order came out around
1500Z on the 10th.
You also need to understand that big DOD is not always a fan of Spec
Ops missions. The initial decision to treat this as a MOTR incident
was just the normal stumbling around that comes from having a host of
agencies--DOD, Homeland Security (because they are in charge of Coast
Guard), State, CIA, DOJ and FBI--sort out who is in charge and what
the options are. It ain't Hollywood and the folks making the
decisions aren't provided with perfect information.
I've earned the enmity of the left for my opposition to Obama, so I am
not trying to make up excuses for him. Another friend, who is a
retired Marine who worked at State and now with FBI's Crisis Incident
Response Group, concurs with my other friend that there was no
pushback from the White House for a minimal force option.
This canard that blames Clinton for treating terrorism as a "criminal
act" vice a military operation is just silly and not true. I have
worked (and to continue to work) with the Special Ops forces that have
the CT mission. The fact is that they rarely find a target where
their resources makes sense. I've been on the ground with these guys
in Iraq so this is not my personal opinion. I'd be happy to chat with
you via phone to explain it in more detail.
Best
LJ
One other point of clarification. There was no request at the outset
from the Captain of the Bainbridge for SEALs or anything else. He was
ordered to steam to the pirated ship and did so. He was not in a
position to know what the situation was at the scene until he arrived.
The SOCOM offer to stand up its forces and deploy was in response to
the news that a US-flagged ship had been hijacked and they simply let
their bosses know they were ready to go if called on.
Let me put this into context. In February 2001 (shortly after Bush was
installed as President) the US Embassy in Ecuador requested that a
force of Special Operations troops (I can't identify the unit but I'm
told that Lee Marvin and Chuck Norris have portrayed this force in a
movie, just saying) be sent to help locate and rescue US oil workers
being held by Colombian guerrillas. At the NSC meeting convened to
consider the request the following people/agencies said "Yes, let's do
it"--Richard Clarke, State Department CT, FBI, DOJ and CIA. The only
agency to say "NO" was DOD J3-SOD. SOCOM wanted to do it but their
boss at DOD said "nyet."
This was under Bush, not Clinton. Just the nature of the beast which
is the bureaucracy.
LJ
4. My request for more information, 4-30-09
-----Original Message-----
From: Alec Rawls
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 1:16 PM
To: 'Larry Johnson'
Cc: Alec Rawls; 'Curt'
Larry:
Another source confirms your 11:00
AM Friday authorization time, and your information all makes perfect sense
to me.
It just leaves a few questions unsettled. Apparently the delay came in
asking the president for authorization, not in the granting of
authorization. The question is why the delay, and how extraordinary is it.
From the outside it LOOKS extraordinary. When the military is en route to a
crisis situation, of course it would be calling in any resources that might
be crucial. Yet a resource that quite obviously MIGHT be crucial was not
deployed for two days.
The seeming implication is that somebody did not want the Spec Ops option to
be available on-site. You mention some kind of turf-battle with Homeland and
other agencies. That fits with the second word-of-sailor account (circulated
by Captain Wellborn, linked in my post). Wellborn's sources were saying that
the conflict was specifically about law-enforcement vs. military response,
with Obama supposedly wanting to make sure that the FBI got control of the
situation.
I don't actually know any of these SEAL-pal sources by the way. I am just
trying to fill out the picture and find out if the information in the two
word-of-sailor reports is accurate. One thing you might be able to help me
with is in determining whether these reports are genuinely sourced. For
instance, Captain Wellborn's sources give a detailed account of the final
action, which might or might not fit with what you heard:
After medically attending to the wounded pirated, and feeding him, come
first light (from the east) on Easter Sunday morning and the pirates saw
they were being towed further out to sea (instead of westward toward land),
the wounded pirate demanded to be returned to the lifeboat. There would BE
NO more negotiations-- and, the four Navy SEAL snipers "in the bubble" went
"Unlock." The pirate holding Captain Philips raised the gun to his head, and
IMMINENT DANGER was so observed and noted in the Log as CO
BAINBRIDGE gave the classic order: WEAPONS RELEASED! I can hear
the echo in my earpiece now, "On my count (from 8.5 seconds), 3, 2, 1, !" POP,
BANG! Out went the window, followed by three simultaneous shots. The
scoreboard flashed: "GAME OVER,GAME OVER-- NAVY 3, PIRATES 0!"
If that is genuine, it increases the credibility of Wellborn's information
about Obama trying to effect his law-enforcement policy preferences (...He
[Obama] reportedly questioned his staff, "Will 'my' FBI people get there
before the Navy does?"...).
There are other details that you might be able to corroborate as well. NBC
reporter Jim Miklaszewski was told by his Pentagon sources that when Philips
made his escape attempt, the Bainbridge was a mile away. Contemporaneous
reports say that the Bainbridge was staying "a few hundred yards away." If
you have a data point for this it would help to determine whether there
really were Pentagon sources out blowing smoke. (These Pentagon sources
could have been civilian. There is no specification in any of these news
reports.)
The distance to the lifeboat is also key to determining the veracity of the
first SEAL-pals report, which claimed that SEALs had the pirates sighted-in
when Philips made his escape attempt Friday morning. Part of that is clearly
incorrect, as neither SEAL team was yet on-scene Friday morning. But if the
Bainbridge was only a couple of hundred yards away, that would be plenty
close for the gunners at one of the Bainbridge's .50 cal machine guns and
one of its 25mm chain guns to have practical accuracy to take out the
lifeboat without endangering Philips nearby in the water (as long as the
chain gunners didn't use HE rounds).
Images from the night before show the lifeboat illuminated by the
Bainbridge, at least with infrared, so if the Bainbridge WAS close by, its
gunners would have had a good view, and must have been crying inside to get
a shoot order. Word of that would get around, which could be the basis of
the SEAL-pals account. On the other hand, if the Bainbridge really was a
mile away, this particular SEAL-pals claim has to be bullshit, which throws
the credibility of the whole into question.
If you have heard either way on any of these details, that information would
be much appreciated.
I would like to talk too. You can call me anytime, or send me your number
and I will call you.
Alec
5. Larry’s short response, 4-30-09.
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Johnson
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 1:40 PM
To: Alec Rawls
Alec,
The account of the rescue is bullshit. SOURCE REDACTED Phillips was at
the doorway taking a piss. This was the first time after the lifeboat
was hooked up to the tow line that the SEALs got all four people on
board the lifeboat in sight at the same time. That's why they took the
shot.
LJ
6. Larry’s longer response, 4-30-09.
-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Johnson
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 3:11 PM
To: Alec Rawls
Alec,
I'll put my answers in caps below (I'm not shouting, it is just to
differentiate between your question and my response).
On Apr 30, 2009, at 4:16 PM, Alec Rawls wrote:
> Larry:
>
> Another source confirms your 11:00
> AM Friday authorization time, and your information all makes perfect
> sense to me.
>
> It just leaves a few questions unsettled. Apparently the delay came in
> asking the president for authorization, not in the granting of
> authorization. The question is why the delay, and how extraordinary
> is it.
THE DELAY IS QUITE NORMAL. DURING THE HEAT OF THE
MOMENT THINGS ARE NOT ALWAYS CRYSTAL CLEAR. THEN
YOU GET THE TURF BATTLE OF WHO IS IN CHARGE AND WHICH
AGENCY IS BEST POSITIONED TO HELP. PLEASE RECALL THAT
DURING THE FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN 1993
THERE WAS A HUGE FIGHT AT THE SCENE BETWEEN FBI, ATF,
PORT AUTHORITY POLICE AND NYPD OVER WHO WAS IN CHARGE.
IT IS JUST HUMAN NATURE.
>
> From the outside it LOOKS extraordinary. When the military is en route to a
> crisis situation, of course it would be calling in any resources that might
> be crucial. Yet a resource that quite obviously MIGHT be crucial was
> not deployed for two days.
>
> The seeming implication is that somebody did not want the Spec Ops option to
> be available on-site. You mention some kind of turf-battle with Homeland and
> other agencies. That fits with the second word-of-sailor account (circulated
> by Captain Wellborn, linked in my post). Wellborn's sources were saying that
> the conflict was specifically about law-enforcement vs. military response,
> with Obama supposedly wanting to make sure that the FBI got control of the
> situation.
>
BECAUSE IT WAS A US FLAGGED VESSEL THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASPECT AUTOMATICALLY KICKS IN. FBI DOES HAVE A
JURISDICTIONAL DOG IN THE FIGHT. FACT IS THAT THE SPEC OPS
FOLKS ROUTINELY TRAIN FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WILL
BE SECURING A SCENE THAT WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE
BUREAU. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO PUSH FOR THE FBI TO
PROVIDE A TACTICAL SOLUTION. THE HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM
(HRT) WAS NEVER ALERTED OR ACTIVATED. THE FBI PROVIDED
THE NEGOTIATORS (THERE IS NO OTHER AGENCY IN GOVERNMENT
WITH THAT CAPABILITY) AND INVESTIGATORS TO GO ON BOARD
THE MAERSK WHEN IT LANDED IN KENYA. THAT IS WHAT THEY
ARE SUPPOSED TO DO.
> I don't actually know any of these SEAL-pal sources by the way. I am
> just trying to fill out the picture and find out if the information in the two
> word-of-sailor reports is accurate. One thing you might be able to help me
> with is in determining whether these reports are genuinely sourced. For
> instance, Captain Wellborn's sources give a detailed account of the final
> action, which might or might not fit with what you heard:
> .....
> After medically attending to the wounded pirated, and feeding him, come
> first light (from the east) on Easter Sunday morning and the pirates
> saw they were being towed further out to sea (instead of westward toward land),
> the wounded pirate demanded to be returned to the lifeboat. There would BE
> NO more negotiations-- and, the four Navy SEAL snipers "in the bubble" went
> "Unlock." The pirate holding Captain Philips raised the gun to his head, and
> IMMINENT DANGER was so observed and noted in the Log as CO BAINBRIDGE gave
> the classic order: WEAPONS RELEASED! I can hear the echo in my earpiece now,
> "On my count (from 8.5 seconds), 3, 2, 1, !" POP, BANG! Out went the window,
> followed by three simultaneous shots. The scoreboard flashed: "GAME OVER,
> GAME OVER-- NAVY 3, PIRATES 0!"
> .....
> If that is genuine, it increases the credibility of Wellborn's information
> about Obama trying to effect his law-enforcement policy preferences (...He
> [Obama] reportedly questioned his staff, "Will 'my' FBI people get there
> before the Navy does?"...).
AS I NOTED IN MY OTHER MESSAGE, THIS IS A FANTASY OF
SOMEONE'S VIVID IMAGINATION.
>
> There are other details that you might be able to corroborate as well. NBC
> reporter Jim Miklaszewski was told by his Pentagon sources that when Philips
> made his escape attempt, the Bainbridge was a mile away. Contemporaneous
> reports say that the Bainbridge was staying "a few hundred yards away." If
> you have a data point for this it would help to determine whether there
> really were Pentagon sources out blowing smoke. (These Pentagon sources
> could have been civilian. There is no specification in any of these news reports.)
>
> The distance to the lifeboat is also key to determining the veracity of the
> first SEAL-pals report, which claimed that SEALs had the pirates sighted-in
> when Philips made his escape attempt Friday morning. Part of that is clearly
> incorrect, as neither SEAL team was yet on-scene Friday morning. But if the
> Bainbridge was only a couple of hundred yards away, that would be plenty
> close for the gunners at one of the Bainbridge's .50 cal machine guns and
> one of its 25mm chain guns to have practical accuracy to take out the
> lifeboat without endangering Philips nearby in the water (as long as the
> chain gunners didn't use HE rounds).
SEALS WERE NOT YET ON BOARD THE BAINBRIDGE ON FRIDAY
MORNING. NONE OF THE CREW ON THE BAINBRIDGE WERE
TRAINED SNIPERS. YOU DO NOT SHOOT AT A LIFEBOAT ON
HEAVING SEAS PARTICULARLY IF THE GUY YOU WANT TO
RESCUE IS ANYWHERE NEAR THE FIELD OF FIRE. MOREOVER,
A .50 CAL OR A CHAIN GUN ARE NOT REPEAT NOT ACCURATE
FIRE SYSTEMS. YOU CAN BLOW THE SHIT OUT OF THE LIFEBOAT
BUT YOU ARE JUST AS LIKELY TO KILL THE CAPTAIN.
>
> Images from the night before show the lifeboat illuminated by the
> Bainbridge, at least with infrared, so if the Bainbridge WAS close by, its
> gunners would have had a good view, and must have been crying inside
> to get a shoot order. Word of that would get around, which could be the basis of
> the SEAL-pals account. On the other hand, if the Bainbridge really was a
> mile away, this particular SEAL-pals claim has to be bullshit, which throws
> the credibility of the whole into question.
>
> If you have heard either way on any of these details, that information would
> be much appreciated.
THE LIFEBOAT WAS NOT ATTACHED TO A TOW LINE, WHICH
THEN BROUGHT THE LIFEBOAT IN BEHIND THE BAINBRIDGE AT
A FIXED DISTANCE OF 30 METERS, UNTIL SUNDAY MORNING. IT
WAS SHORTLY AFTER THE LIFEBOAT WAS HOOKED TO THE
BAINBRIDGE THAT THE SEAL SNIPERS FINALLY GOT A FIX ON
ALL FOUR PERSONS ON BOARD THE CRAFT AND COULD SHOOT
SAFELY WITHOUT HITTING PHILLIPS. ALSO, PLEASE NOTE THAT
REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT THE SEALS WANTED TO ATTACK
THE LIFEBOAT WITH COMBAT SWIMMERS IS PURE NONSENSE.
WAS NOT EVEN CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION.
Back to the hijacking update post that links to this email exchange
at Error Theory
Back to my "Pentagon lied" post
at Error Theory